opinions!) from Rapanos v. United States were binding. 13 But no longer. In December 2017, the Court granted review of a case implicating the Freeman circuit split-and so now has a perfect opportunity to take stock of Marks. 14 This Article argues that the Marks rule is wrong, root and stem, and should be abandoned. Instead of asking about the "narrowest grounds," courts should simply ask whether a single rule of decision has the express support of at least five justices. While Marks has been criticized many times before, 15 its practical consequences and defects have not been fully recognized. As a result, commentators who start out criticizing Marks typically end up offering their own proposed versions of this fundamentally broken test. 16 And lower courts, feeling bound by vertical stare decisis, struggle over Marks rather setting it aside. It is time to step back and think about whether the Marks rule ever made sense in the first place. After doing so, the solution becomes apparent: courts should adhere to the normal majority rule for precedent formation in all cases. 17 When the justices do not express majority agreement, there is no logical or inevitable basis for inferring majority approval for any particular rule of decision. Thus, no precedent should be created. This approach places the burden of precedent formation where it belongs: with the justices of the Supreme Court. Moreover, it turns out that not much would be lost by abandoning Marks. The Court itself has rested only a handful of decisions on the Marks rule. And while lower courts frequently apply Marks, the rule tends to make a practical difference only in cases where it is either applied inconsistently or supportive of outlier views. In short, the Court can and should declare that the Marks rule is no more.
To support that conclusion, this Article provides the first systematic empirical assessment of the Marks rule by surveying all Marks rule citations in appellate courts through November 2017-including the Supreme Court, the federal courts of appeals, and state appellate courts. It turns out that the Marks rule is being cited in lower courts with rapidly increasing frequency. In time, Marks could become a framework method, somewhat akin to Chevron. But despite the rule's increasing importance, it is hard to see how use of the Marks rule has benefitted the judicial system. Because it applies precisely when there is no majority view of the law, Marks creates precedents that are unlikely to be either legally correct or practically desirable. The 370, 376 (1968) ( proposing that "the opinion that the most nondissenting judges vote for" should "become the official opinion of the court"). 16 A recent example is Ryan Williams, Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and Precedential Constraint, 69 STAN. L. REV. 795 (2017), discussed below in Section II.B.3. See also previous note. Mark Alan Thurmon's perspicacious student note comes closest to the bottom line endorsed here in concluding (for different reasons) that the Marks rule is "unsupportable," but Thurmon went on to suggest a complex "hybrid" approach that assigns persuasive authority in proportion to the number of joins for each opinion. Note, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419, 420 (1992) . 17 We might distinguish between a precedent's formation (the subject of the present paper), implementation (such as whether it is narrowed or extended), and possible elimination (paradigmatically by overruling).
Marks rule is most defensible when viewed as a "precedent default," that is, as an interpretive principle that the Court has established to guide its own internal decision-making, as well as later courts' interpretation of fragmented decisions. Yet even that sympathetic effort to rationalize Marks leads to its undoing. The most efficient precedent default is a simple requirement of majority approval. That straightforward approach would both encourage majority opinion formation and avoid speculative inquiries into what the openly disagreeing justices "must" have agreed on. The net result would be more efficiency, lower costs, and greater accuracy. In this context, the rule of law calls for one less rule.
Once the Marks rule is set aside, other aspects of precedent and Supreme Court practice appear in a new light. First, the Marks rule's practical operation draws attention to hierarchical differences in the U.S. judicial system. Unlike the justices, the lower courts frequently cite the Marks rule-but some lower courts are choosing to construe the rule narrowly, to mute its worst effects. These hierarchical dynamics draw attention to Marks's genuine strengths, as well as to opportunities for lower courts to facilitate Marks's abandonment. Second, the case against the Marks rule suggests that even the result in fractured cases should not be treated as binding. When most justices cannot agree on a legal principle, later courts should feel free to arrive at their own conclusions. The same reasoning suggests that unexplained summary rulings, too, should lack precedential effect. 18 Finally, greater attention is owed to a lesser known principle of Supreme Court decision-making: the Screws rule. 19 The Screws rule maintains that a justice's vote in deciding a case may rest in part on the need to create a majority on the judgment, or even to create a majority precedent. 20 This principle has arisen organically in separate opinions without obtaining majority endorsement in any given case, yet it suggests a defensible view of the justices' power to cast precedential votes. Moreover, Screws offers a way to predict how judicial decision-making might proceed once the Court moves beyond the Marks rule.
I. Marks in Practice
The Marks rule just turned forty and is more influential than ever. This Part explores how the rule first arose and now operates in practice, including by presenting the first comprehensive empirical study of how appellate courts actually use the Marks rule
A. Making Marks
Far from having an ancient pedigree, the Marks rule is an invention of the last forty years. 21 And the rule's origins suggest that it sprang more from the convenience of a specific historical moment than any deep or well-considered legal principle. 18 See infra note 124. 19 See, e.g., H. Ron Davidson Though first adopted by a majority opinion in Marks v. United States, the rule originated in the plurality opinion in Gregg v. Georgia. 22 That origin is noteworthy because Gregg was itself a fragmented decision. In other words, the Gregg plurality announced a rule of precedent that-surprise-afforded precedential weight to plurality opinions. And that self-justifying assertion of authority mattered. In an even earlier case, Furman v. Georgia, the Court had badly divided over the constitutionality of capital punishment. 23 After years of confusion, Gregg purported to settle the constitutionality of capital punishment-yet Gregg, too, divided the Court. On the way toward allowing for capital punishment, the lead plurality included a footnote that applied what would later become known as the Marks rule. The footnote was in support of the view that the narrowest concurring opinions in Furman had reserved-and so left open-capital punishment's "per se" constitutionality. 24 And Gregg adduced no authority for the narrowest grounds test. But perhaps none was needed: if the Marks rule were really correct, then the Gregg plurality itself was likely the "narrowest" opinion and therefore binding. The Gregg plurality's assertion of the Marks rule thus has an oddly self-referential quality.
The next term, Marks applied its eponymous rule in the context of a dispute over allegedly ex post facto criminal punishment for obscenity. Some background is required. In 1957, Roth v. United States had adopted a relatively permissive approach to obscenity prosecutions, notwithstanding the First Amendment. 25 Then, in 1966, the Court issued a fragmented decision in Memoirs v. Massachusetts. 26 Most justices agreed that the obscenity conviction in Memoirs could not stand, and every test proposed by the concurring justices offered greater First Amendment rights than the Roth test. But the justices split as to the appropriate First Amendment standard. In later cases, the Court began a practice of summarily reversing obscenity convictions "that at least five members of the Court, applying their separate tests, found to be protected by the First Amendment." 27 The Court applied that approach thirtyone separate times. 28 During that period, the defendants in Marks trafficked in allegedly obscene materials, before their operation came to an end in early 1973. A few months later, the Court decided Miller v. California, which rejected the test employed by the Memoirs plurality and restored a more pro-government standard. 29 The Marks defendants were then tried and convicted based on the new Miller standard. The defendants appealed, arguing that they should benefit from the more defendant-friendly legal standard that prevailed at the time of their conductnamely, the standard set out by the Memoirs plurality.
In Marks the Court ruled in favor of the defendants on the theory that the Memoirs plurality set the governing law until Miller. The Court began by stating the precedential rule that decision but disagree as to the correct grounds for the decision, extracting a ratio decidendi from the case may be an arbitrary exercise."); RUPERT CROSS & J.W. HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 90-93 (4th ed. 1991) (exploring the possible implications of no-majority decisions in the English judicial system). 22 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 169 n. 15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ.)). 23 408 U.S. 238 (1972) . 24 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169 n.15 (identifying the Stewart and White opinions in Furman as that case's "holding"). The footnote cross-referenced another footnote relating to a discussion of what "Furman held." Id. at 188 & n.36. But that discussion seems predicated on majority agreement across the Furman opinions. See id. n.36 (documenting that a certain "view was expressed by other Members of the Court who concurred in the judgments"). 25 193 U.S. 476 (1957) . 26 383 U. S. 413 (1966) . 27 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 n.3 (1973) . 28 Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 n.7. 29 413 U.S. 15.
the Greggs plurality had asserted just the year before. But because Marks was the first majority opinion to state it, the rule is now known by that case's name. 30 Marks then reviewed the fragmented decision set out in Memoirs. A three-justice plurality had adopted a multipart test offering First Amendment protection unless the expression at issue is "utterly without redeeming social value." Two justices had concluded that obscenity prosecutions were essentially impermissible in all cases. Finally, one justice had advanced a stringent test for obscenity prosecutions, allowing them only for "hardcore pornography." After summarizing these Memoirs opinions, the Court concluded: "The view of the Memoirs plurality therefore constituted the holding of the Court and provided the governing standards." 31 Instead of explaining that result, the Court pointed to corroborating evidence: "every Court of Appeals that considered the question between Memoirs and Miller so read our decisions." 32 In a footnote, Marks also noted its earlier practice of resolving cases summarily based on what "at least five members" of the Memoirs Court would do, judging from the various tests espoused in that case. 33 The best reading of Marks is indeed that it establishes the broad Marks rule. Yet a more cautiously reasoned opinion in Marks could have relied on any number of case-specific factors. Marks arose in the context where notice is triply essential-namely, a criminal prosecution where the defendants invoked both ex post facto and First Amendment principles. That unusual circumstance plausibly called for the government to meet an especially high standard of precedential clarity. 34 And there were many reasons to think that a reasonable criminal defendant would have concluded, based on the notice then available, that Roth no longer established the governing law. As we have seen, Marks itself emphasized that the lower courts had converged on the Memoirs plurality. And the Court's thirty-one summary reversals-each supported by majority vote-had applied the test of the Memoirs plurality, in conjunction with other Memoirs tests, as a rule of decision. 35 Yet the Court's statement of the Marks rule was not limited to the case's ex post facto context or dependent on statements in the previous summary rulings. And the lower courts' convergence on the Memoirs plurality was adduced more as confirmation than proof-with the summary reversals relegated to a footnote.
There is an underappreciated strategic aspect to the Court's reliance on the Marks rule in Marks itself. As noted, the rule originated in the Gregg plurality, which purported to settle longstanding disputes on the constitutionality of capital punishment. But as a mere plurality, the Gregg plurality had only a questionable claim to precedential authority. Thus, Gregg arguably failed to resolve the national confusion over capital punishment that Furman had created. That precedential shortfall might have troubled one member of the Gregg plurality, namely, Justice Lewis F. Powell-the author of Marks. By including the Marks rule in his majority opinion in Marks, Powell retroactively suggested that his own preferred resolution in Gregg was the governing precedent. In this way, the clear precedential authority of a majority opinion indirectly blessed the more dubious authority of a plurality. 36 rule may have stemmed not just from the First Amendment and ex post facto issues posed by Memoirs, but also from a desire to resolve the post-Gregg ambiguity in the law of capital punishment. 37 As we will see, however, the Marks rule has come to reach well beyond that narrow compass.
B. The Supreme Court
Since its invention, the Marks rule has made regular if infrequent appearances in the US Reports. During the years immediately after Marks, the Court had several occasions to engage with the ex post facto and First Amendment aspects of that ruling. From 1977 to 1979, for instance, the Court cited Marks no fewer than six times-but never for the Marks rule. 38 Indeed, no justice cited the Marks rule until 1986, 39 with the first majority opinion citing and applying Marks in 1988-over a decade after Marks itself. 40 In total, the Court's majority opinions have cited Marks for the Marks rule eight times, or about every five years. 41 In five of those majority opinions, the Court succinctly applied the Marks rule to find a binding precedent, 42 including a precedent that created "clearly established law" under AEDPA. 43 In another case, the majority simply noted that the decision below had applied Marks. 44 In the other two majority opinions, the Court noted Marks rule issues only to avoid them. To wit, the Court has not once but twice explained that the Marks rule is "more easily stated than applied" and that it is "not useful to pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously baffled and divided the lower courts." 45 In both of those cases, the Court ultimately chose not to apply the Marks rule at all.
In addition, about fifteen non-majority opinions have cited the Marks rule, for various reasons. Sometimes, a justice writes separately to bow to the force of Marks, such as when Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the Casey plurality was binding even though he had dissented in that case. 46 In other cases, a separate opinion disputes a majority's application of Marks. Such a dispute arose in the first majority opinion that invoked Marks: in the dissent's view, it made no sense to choose a particular opinion as narrowest and therefore binding when that opinion's reading of case law "was rejected by more Justices than accepted it at the time that [ 51 But Scalia then put his own gloss on the import of the Stevens opinion. In Scalia's view, the binding effect of Stevens's opinion was "that 'proceeds' means 'profits' when there is no legislative history to the contrary." 52 On that basis, Scalia concluded that Santos yielded no Marks holding "when contrary legislative history does exist."
53 After all, Scalia explained, eight justices (the plurality and dissenters) had "apparently" rejected that view. 54 Stevens responded that the plurality's Marks "speculat[ion]" was dicta and that the plurality's reading of Stevens's opinion was "not correct."
55 As we will see below, lower courts frequently struggle with how to apply the Marks rule to Santos, thereby replicating the Court's own confusion.
All told, there are roughly twenty Supreme Court cases that include one or more opinions that expressly cite the Marks rule. To some extent, that tally is the tip of a larger doctrinal iceberg. The justices might sometimes rely on the Marks rule implicitly, particularly when its application seems obvious. There are also examples of the Court alluding to the Marks rule without citing Marks. 56 Yet the Court more often glides over potential Marks rule issues without confronting them. For example, the Court sometimes describes plurality opinions as the voice of "the Court," without noting either that the ruling was a plurality or that the case involved a concurrence in the judgment. 57 These decisions may reflect a sub silentio Marks analysis, but they could also reflect simple errors, or even ignorance of the Marks rule.
Still, the basic picture is clear enough. After about a decade of dormancy, the Marks rule has become a regular if peripheral feature of Supreme Court opinions. Sometimes, application of the rule seems easy enough and garners consensus among the justices. But the use of the rule has also been a source of some controversy and confusion on the Court. 48 Freeman as providing the reasoning of "the Court" without ever noting it was quoting a plurality opinion. Also interestingly, non-majority opinions sometimes speak as though they have majority support, which could be viewed as an effort to claim precedential influence in the face of (what at least could be) majority opposition See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1665 (2015) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (using "we hold" language in a passage that lacked majority support).
C. Federal Courts of Appeals
Though only intermittently appearing in the Supreme Court, the Marks rule is becoming ever more salient in the federal courts of appeals. Much as in the Court, however, the Marks rule was initially dormant. This basic story is reflected in Table 1 below.   58 As the Table reflects, the early years of the Marks rule saw it cited only a handful of times in federal courts of appeals, including both majority opinions as well as other opinions. During the same period, other aspects of Marks received dozens of citations. Over time, however, the Marks rule has come to dominate all Marks citations. Federal circuit court citations to the First Amendment and ex post facto aspects of Marks never substantially increased and eventually declined. By contrast, citations to the Marks rule climbed steadily in all federal circuit courts. Marks rule citations began to overtake other Marks citations around 2000. 59 This upward trend is significant because most precedents decline in value over time, yielding progressively fewer citations. 60 The steep rise in citations after 2000 may be partly explained by Marks's salient role in affirmative action litigation up to and including Grutter v. Bollinger. 61 In recent 58 All data in this Section is based on Westlaw searches of recorded federal court of appeals opinions that cite Marks through November 2017, with Marks citations unrelated to the Marks rule excluded from consideration. Cases that expressly rely on prior Marks applications are counted, as are cases that ultimately find no precedent under Marks. Opinions that are withdrawn or superseded are excluded. Cases were coded by myself and the research assistants noted in the star note. Some coding decisions reflect judgments, so the data is more useful for its patterns than its exact figures or rankings. As this is a draft, I plan to update this information. 59 So while the Marks rule is cited with increasing frequency, the vast majority of federal circuit decisions that engage with fragmented rulings do so without citing Marks or discernibly undertaking a Marks analysis. Why does that disparity arise? At least some lower courts implicitly rely on Marks, without citing it. 65 More often, lower courts cite fragmented decisions in ways that don't require them to focus on Marks or to specify the decisions' precedential status. For example, circuit courts frequently cite plurality opinions for points that are peripheral to the dispute at hand or that could easily be supported by majority decisions in other cases. 66 At other times, circuit courts rely on precedent for reasons that do not involve Marks, such as by citing plurality opinions for their persuasive effect or piecing together majority agreement on distinct 64 Some commenters view Marks as a response to increasing rates of fractured opinions, but Marks's rise in the lower courts seems not to track changes in the rates of fragmented decisions. Cf. Kimura, supra note 15, at 1625 (counting partial majority opinions to find about 10 plurality decisions per term in the 1980s). 65 Courts sometimes find "narrowest" or "controlling" concurrences without citing Marks. Cf principles based on statements in separate opinions. 67 And, like the Supreme Court, circuit courts sometimes cite pluralities as providing the holding of "the Court," without evincing awareness that the cited opinion is not a majority. 68 The concurrence in the judgment may go unmentioned or even be portrayed as a full concurrence. 69 In sum, Marks-free citations to fragmented rulings may reflect implicit Marks applications, a lack of any need to engage Marks, or inattentive failures to apply the Marks rule.
But why do some cases attract Marks citations at all, or in greater numbers, when others don't? Again, Table 2 shows that a case's total number of citations does not explain the number of times it is Marks'd. And while many judges and parties probably remain unaware of the Marks rule, despite its increasing salience, that prospect cannot explain why Marks attention is so concentrated on a relatively small number of cases. The most plausible explanation would focus on decision-making incentives: because parties and courts alike presumably try to avoid unnecessary precedential debates, they may cite and apply the Marks rule only when a key precedent in dispute is fragmented. Thus, fragmented decisions are especially unlikely to yield Marks attention when they address non-dispositive topics or echo rules laid out in other cases' majority opinions. By contrast, fragmented rulings are more likely to generate Marks attention, especially when cases are on appeal, when they offer the only authority on a recurring question and when the opinions diverge in an outcome-determinative way. In addition, the circuit courts may be likely to cite the Marks rule only when they are unsure of how to assess the precedential impact of a fragmented decision. Where a decision's precedential import is apparent, whether due to Marks or some other principle, courts may assert as much without citation.
When 79 All data in this Section is based on Westlaw searches of state court cases that cite Marks through November 2017, with Marks citations unrelated to the Marks rule and in trial-level courts excluded. As in the previous section, cases that expressly rely on prior Marks applications are counted, as are cases that find no precedent under Marks; but opinions that are withdrawn or superseded are excluded. DC is counted as a state. Cases were coded by myself and the research assistants noted in the star note. Some coding decisions reflect judgments, so the data is more useful for its patterns than exact figures or rankings. Again, this is a draft, so I plan to update this data. Though still few in number, these citations are remarkable. 82 The Marks rule does not purport to apply to state court decisions, and the Court presumably lacks authority over interpretation of state court precedents. Partly due to the confusion attending the Marks rule, some state courts have come to question or reject the Marks rule as applied to their own state court rulings. 83 Still, the Marks rule's presence in state jurisprudence demonstrates the Court's ability to bring uniformity to state-court decision-making, even when it lacks binding precedential power.
The distribution of Marks rule citations in state courts is even more focused than in the federal courts of appeals. The Marks rule has appeared in over 300 state appellate opinions that are searchable in Westlaw; and the state appellate courts have applied the rule to about 50 Supreme Court decisions, as well as many state court decision. Below, Table 4 lists the twenty fragmented decisions that the state appellate courts have most often "Marks'd," including all fragmented decisions Marks'd in three or more state appellate opinions (whether majorities or separate writings). As with the federal courts, there is no significant relationship between the frequency with which a case is Marks'd in the state appellate courts and either the case's age or its total number of citations. As the Wash. 2d 517, 532 n.7 (2010) ("When there is no majority opinion, the holding is the narrowest ground upon which a majority agreed."). 82 Cf. Levermore, supra note 78, at 123 n.18 ("[I]t seems obvious that any court (state or federal) should apply Marks when construing a U.S. Supreme Court opinion; the less obvious point is that the same rule applies in the context of state supreme court decisions."). 83 See, e.g., State v. Ruem, 179 Wash. 2d 195, 220 n.7 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (en banc) (Johnosn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I see no reason for this court to follow [the Marks] rule because of the significant differences between this court and our federal counterpart."); State v. Kikuta, 125 Haw. 78, 97 n.14 (2011) (finding the Marks rule "has been discredited" based on scholarship and Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994)). While many features of the state list resemble its federal counterpart, there are some salient differences. For one thing, two of the cases that have seen the largest numbers of Marks rule citations in the federal courts do not appear at all on the state-court list. The reason is straightforward: the two Court cases in question, Freeman and Santos, both involved federal criminal law and so don't pertain to state court practice. Likewise, Rapanos, a major Marks case in the federal courts, involves an issue of federal jurisdiction and so is absent from the state courts. Replacing them at the top of the state-court list are two fragmented decisions on criminal procedure issues that do frequently arise in state courts. Notably, Seibert was in third place on the federal circuit list and is also first on the state list.
Another interesting feature is that state courts have frequently Marks'd the Court's decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, even though that case involved a full majority opinion and so-on its face-was not a "fragmented" decision at all. The basic reason for applying Marks in Melendez-Diaz is that Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurrence that expressly "join[ed] the Court's opinion" but only because the case's facts satisfied a separate test that only Thomas subscribed to. 84 The fact that state courts think that Marks is relevant to Melendez-Diaz suggests either that those courts do not regard Thomas's concurrence as a true concurrence or that they view Marks as an application of the predictive model of precedent, such that the goal of lower court judges is to anticipate how the justices would come out in a given 84 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (Thomas, J., concurring) (2009). Thomas's opinion can thus be viewed as creating a "compromise majority." See infra Section III.B. 89 Finally, Seibert offers a similar story in both the federal and state courts, with most but not all courts converging on the concurrence in the judgment. 90 * * * The Marks rule offers a case study in precedential expansion. Though prompted by exceptional circumstances that could easily have spawned a confined ruling, Marks propounded a broad rule-indeed, the very same rule that Marks's author, Justice Powell, had himself earlier supported as part of the Gregg plurality. Neither Gregg nor Marks offered any explanation or independent authority in support of the Marks rule, and the rule largely lay dormant for years. Gradually, however, interest in the Marks rule increased. And citations to the Marks rule accelerated in the early 2000s, fueled by the affirmative action litigation culminating in Grutter, as well as consequential fragmented decisions like Rapanos and Seibert. The Marks rule's intuitive appeal has even caused it to be integrated into litigation over the meaning of state court precedents. But despite its increasing popularity, the Marks rule appears in citations only in a small portion of cases addressing fragmented decisions. And, in many cases, the Marks rule itself generates intractable disagreement, such as when widespread agreement on the meaning of 85 See, e.g., People v. Davis, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 472, 479 n. 6 (2011) ("While on its face [Melendez-Diaz] could be dubbed a 'majority' opinion, we refer to it as a plurality opinion because the language of Justice Thomas's concurrence makes clear that his assent to the opinion was not a blanket endorsement of its entire rationale."). 86 Freeman recently gave way to an entrenched circuit split. A rule that is so evidently both important and uncertain warrants closer scrutiny.
II. Theorizing Marks
This Part argues that majority agreement among the justices should be an essential condition for the creation of Supreme Court precedent. And the Marks rule is, at best, an inefficient way of communicating that agreement. Marks thus offers an inefficient "precedent default" that is better replaced by a familiar alternative: the Court creates a precedent only when most justices agree on the same legal principle. Until the Court adopts this reform, lower courts should help usher the Marks rule offstage.
A. The Majority Rule
Marks took for granted the longstanding precept that precedent can arise when there is a "single rationale explaining the result" that "enjoys the assent of five Justices."
91 That generally sufficient condition of precedent formation could be called "the majority rule." The Marks rule presents itself as supplementary to the majority rule, in that it expressly dictates whether precedent is formed when the majority rule is not satisfied.
92 But why add the Marks rule at all, as opposed to simply adhering to the majority rule in all cases? In other words, why not view the majority rule as a necessary condition for precedent formation? This Section considers various potential answers and ultimately finds them unpersuasive.
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In general, Supreme Court precedent arises when most justices endorse the same legal principle in a single decision. That majority rule has deep roots in judicial tradition, 94 as well as intuitive appeal. 95 Consider the following argument. Whatever the ultimate reason for having Court precedent, it seems fair to assume that each justice has the same claim to precedential authority, either because they all share comparable expertise and participate in the same deliberative process or because they all obtained the same office through the same constitutional 91 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) . 92 See id.; see also text accompanying supra note 2 (quoting the rule). 93 Throughout this Article, I assume the basic features of modern stare decisis, particularly that Court precedents can arise from the holding of a single case and thereby set binding, nationally uniform law. While the efficiency and uniformity benefits of modern stare decisis are apparent, a critic might argue for a return to founding-era common law practice, which did not regard individual decisions as binding and so fostered a less hierarchical, perhaps humbler judiciary. See infra note 130 and accompanying text (describing weaker and more diffuse precedents at common law). Such a critic would a fortiori reject the Marks rule. See Hochschild, supra note 15.
94 U.S. CONST. art. III; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 356-61 (2012) (suggesting that the majority rule for precedent formation is established by constitutional text and tradition); supra note 21 (collecting sources on the traditionally limited precedential implications of fragmented decisions). The judgments of an Anglo-American court traditionally flow from majority votes. That rule extends not just to cases, but also to internal court procedure. The few exceptions, like the "rule of four" to grant certiorari, see Richard process. 96 Thus, it would be irrational to ascribe precedential weight to a principle that most of the justices have deliberately declined to endorse. The fact that some of the justices endorse a principle would necessarily be outweighed by the correlative fact that more justices have refused to endorse it. That simple argument is at odds with the Marks rule, whose basic goal is to ascribe precedential force to certain minority views.
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A defender of the Marks rule might respond that the law of precedent should privilege certain types of votes, even when they are cast by only a minority of the justices. 98 For example, scholars have debated the appeal of supermajority rules that aim to achieve various aims, such as advancing substantive principles of administrative deference. 99 And where a supermajority rule has bite, a minority gets its way. Supermajority rules normally pertain to discrete cases, but they could in principle apply as well to precedential rules. Yet the Marks rule is doubly disqualified from taking advantage of that line of reasoning: not only does the rule not constitute a heightened voting requirement, but it is also transsubstantive. So Marks does not systematically favor any substantive type of decision, such as deference to administrative agencies.
Still, the Marks rule's distinctive structure does lend itself to a different basis for minority empowerment. In some decision-making contexts, the relative orientation of different viewpoints can arguably support privileging some viewpoints over others. For example, a supporter of "trimming" might defend Marks as an accuracy-promoting decision-making heuristic: by inviting each justice to express their views on the merits and then disqualifying extreme options, the Marks rule may preference "narrower" opinions that lie "in between" the relatively dubious extremes.
100 But argument would be problematic, even apart from potential difficulties identifying which opinion is "in between" others. The virtues of trimming, even if significant, do not necessarily suffice to justify the creation of precedent, particularly since they can conflict with the results of the Court's deliberative process. It is far from clear, for example, that an "in between" view supported by, say, one justice has any greater claim to correctness than any other view. If anything, a view that eight justices have deliberately rejected would seem uniquely questionable-and so undeserving of precedential status.
Rather than celebrating minoritarian decision-making, a defender of the Marks rule might cast it as both a product of the majority rule and a means of facilitating that rule's future operation. 101 In Marks, a majority of the justices arguably set a meta-rule or "precedent default"
96 Some judges or justices are remembered more or less fondly, and their views accordingly take on greater or lesser persuasive force. For example, the Court sometimes points out when it cites opinions by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. But even then, rules of precedent formation are not thought to change. 97 By its terms, the Marks rule applies when the majority rule does not, namely, "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices." Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (internal quotation marks omitted). 98 On whether to require a supermajority requirement for overruling, see RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT ch. 7 (2017). Further, the Court itself has suggested that thin majorities might be entitled to less precedential weight. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828-829 (1991) (overruling cases "decided by the narrowest of margins"). 99 See Jacob E. in favor of ascribing precedential force to opinions that, on their face, lack majority support. 102 And subsequent Court majorities have endorsed, or at least declined to repudiate, that precedent default. 103 One might therefore conclude that most justices desire the Marks rule's continued application, even if it occasionally results in precedents that have only minority support. Further, the Marks rule arguably enables future majoritarian decision-making. In effect, the Marks rule allows the justices to know that the "position taken by those members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds" will be precedential. 104 Based on that knowledge, the justices can join or oppose opinions to achieve desired precedential outcomes-a process that Saul Levmore has called "bargaining around the narrowest-majority rule."
105 And even after a fragmented decision issues, the Marks rule continues to operate as a precedent default by helping litigants and courts to recognize the precedential rule that the justices expected.
Defending the Marks rule as a precedent default encounters some difficulty, since the rule is too indeterminate to allow confident predictions. As we will see in the next Section, there are several different versions of the Marks rule in circulation, and even the justices themselves exhibit confusion about how the Marks rule works. 106 So any attempt to use the Marks rule as a predictive aid is more likely to generate confusion than guidance. But the Marks rule's present indeterminacy only counsels in favor of adopting a more specific version of the rule, preferably one that allows for relatively objective, predictable application.
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The more fundamental problem is that any version of the Marks rule is bound to be a less efficient precedent default than a numerical voting rule, such as the majority rule. By requiring the justices to identify areas of majority agreement at the time that they issue a fragmented decision, the majority rule would save litigants and courts from both error and unnecessary effort. And the majority rule also gives the justices a more reliable means of anticipating the precedential consequences of their votes. To adapt the language of law and economics, the law of precedent should place burdens on the "cheapest precedent-creator"-that is, the decisionmaker who can most accurately and inexpensively avoid precedential confusion. 108 In many contexts, the legal system benefits by delegating interpretive work to the lower courts, fostering percolation. But when it comes to identifying majority agreement on the Court, the most efficient actor-the cheapest precedent creator-is the Court itself, at the time of its decision. The justices are already familiar with the facts, issues, and opinions in any fragmented decision. And the justices are uniquely knowledgeable about their own agreements and disagreements. By comparison, later courts staffed by different judges have to expend considerable energy just to formulate an intelligent opinion about the holding of a fragmented decision. And even then, later 102 Williams raises the possibility of viewing the Marks rule as a "default rule" but does not explore whether the rule is inefficient and therefore undesirable. Williams, supra note 16, at 849. Instead, Williams attempts to ascertain what preexisting default rule is most supported by existing legal materials. See id.
103 Viewing Marks as a precedent default raises the possibility that it might be revised or eliminated through means other than a case or controversy. Perhaps the justices could adopt a Supreme Court Rule on point, thereby establishing their desired mode of communicating their views to the legal system. courts are not as well positioned to ascertain either the "narrowest grounds" or whether the justices have reached implicit agreement. Yet the Marks rule forces later courts to take positions on those issues, thereby creating a new interpretive burden.
Of course, the justices' decisions would sometimes fail to satisfy the majority rule, even if Marks were abandoned. In those cases, fragmented decisions would remain just that: a collection of disagreements, without precedential effect. But that result would at least lay bare what many supporters of the Marks rule deny-namely, that there is no majority agreement hidden amidst the competing opinions. 109 Further, the justices' failure to settle on a single principle with majority support would itself be strong evidence that there is no urgent need for new precedent creation. One might worry that justices would sometimes refuse to compromise on what they perceive to be clearly correct positions, even when compromise would be highly beneficial. If that intransigence were likely, then there would be at least some reason to consider adopting a rule that generated precedent without majority agreement. But as we will see in Part III, the justices routinely compromise when joining and drafting opinions. Even formalists like Justices Black, Scalia, and Thomas have openly joined or authored compromise opinions, despite having to set aside their own personal views. 110 Moreover, the justices are well-positioned to assess the need for compromise in any given case, since they monitor the lower courts via the cert pool and have the benefit of briefing from interested parties, including the United States and other amici curiae. So if most justices could not agree or compromise on a single principle of decision, then there would likely be no need to establish such a principle. If anything, the most plausible inference would be that percolation is called for-and that rushing to make nationally uniform precedent on the merits would be harmful.
In requiring the Court to identify the precedential implications of its own fragmented decisions, consistent adherence to the majority rule would also generate desirable incentives for the justices. Let us assume that each justice is substantially if not primarily motivated by a desire to craft precedents that maximize correct outcomes in later cases. 111 The likelihood of correctly decided later cases would then be a function of two variables that are at least partially within the justice's control: first, the later court's degree of obedience to the precedent; and, second, the similarity between the precedent and the justice's own views of the law. Each justice's ideal outcome would thus be to generate a majority opinion that precisely corresponded with her own views, thereby maximizing the odds that later courts would adhere to her views. When that option is unavailable, the justice would have an incentive to tradeoff similarity in favor of obedience. That is, each justice will have reason to join a compromise majority that approximates her own views. And, at some point, most justices would rather establish no precedent than accept a strained compromise. cases. Rather than do the hard work of forging a majority compromise, the justice can attempt to write the "narrowest" opinion in the case. If the justice accomplishes this goal, she can maximize both obedience and similarity-essentially, having her cake and eating it too-even though most justices disagree with her. 114 Of course, the justices would still have reason to form majorities, including opinion-writing efficiency, tradition, and collegiality. 115 But the Marks rule's marginal effect would be to discourage the creation of majority opinions in many cases. A justice's effort to seize the narrowest ground would be especially likely to prevail when other justices are less willing to jockey for the "narrowest" opinion, perhaps because they have previously staked out strong positions on the issue.
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At this point, a Marks proponent might raise two counterarguments. First, insisting on strict adherence to the majority rule necessarily means diminishing the amount of precedent created by fragmented decisions, particularly for lower courts.
117 Even Marks's detractors often lambast the Court when it fails to form precedential majority opinions.
118 But more precedent is not necessarily better. When confronting a challenging legal issue, it may be better for the Court to err on the side of not deciding. 119 Critics who wish that the Court more often reached binding decisions do not often account for the risk that more decisions could mean more error. Nor do these critics account for the benefits of leaving the lower courts free to experiment, after learning from the justices' conflicting opinions. 120 The point here is not that legal correctness is always more important than settlement.
121 Rather, the point is that the justices themselves are generally in the best position to address the inevitable tradeoff between correctness and settlement, as well our hypothesis that plurality decisions are more likely to result after Marks, as there is virtually no difference in the rate of plurality decisions before and after 114 See Berkolow, supra note 113, at 352 ("[P]ositive political theoretical conceptions of judicial strategy suggest that the Marks doctrine should incentivize separate opinions."); Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 549 (1998) (book review) (raising the possibility that, in light of the Marks rule and the predictive model, "a concurring fifth Justice has no reason to compromise his or her position, as his or her lone concurrence would serve to functionally define the law"). 115 See also Cross, supra note 114, at 550 (noting the possibility of a "prestige" appeal to forming part of a majority opinion). 116 This point suggests that median justices may be relatively likely to claim the middle ground, rather than form majority opinions. Notably, Justice Kennedy is responsible for some frequent objects of Marks attention, including concurrences in the judgment in Rapanos and Seibert. 117 as tradeoffs among other values, such as coherence and fairness. The majority rule facilitates the justices' efforts to weigh those tradeoffs on a case by case basis.
Second, a defender of the Marks rule might object that bad incentives would flow from denying precedential effect to fragmented decisions. Linking judgment and precedent forces the Court to see beyond the parties before it and to consider the lasting consequences of its rulings. 122 Without that forward-looking constraint, the Court could conceivably be more tempted to issue case-specific rulings in favor of preferred parties. Yet the Marks rule's disciplining effect is both too small and too indiscriminate. In terms of its magnitude, the Marks rule still allows the justices to rule on one-off theories or emphasize factual nuances that are unlikely to recur. And other aspects of legal practice, such as the binding force of past precedent and the general judicial duty of explanation, independently discipline judicial decision-making. These alternative means of imposing discipline also have the advantage of distinguishing between wise and manipulative decisions to avoid creating precedent. When the justices seem to issue case-specific rulings for cynical reasons, dissenters and others can and often do cry foul.
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But when a cautious, case-specific approach seems wise, justices and commentators would not complain of a similarly narrow ruling.
Finally, someone uninterested in defending Marks might object that at least the results of a fragmented decision must be treated as precedential, even if no precedent forms under the Marks rule.
124 That view, sometimes called "result-based stare decisis," 125 in effect represents a precedent default in favor of viewing the facts before the Court as legally requiring whatever judgment the Court issued. 126 A fragmented ruling might then apply only in cases whose facts differed in manifestly arbitrary ways-thereby leaving the ruling with limited future effect.
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Adopting that approach in lieu of the Marks rule would be a major improvement, since it would minimize the precedential effects of fragmented decisions.
128 And it would be quite possible for Yet the logic of the majority rule ultimately cuts against even results-based stare decisis, including when it applies to unexplained summary rulings. Insofar as a later court did attempt to generalize beyond the fragmented ruling's precise factual background, it would construct a rule that could very well have been rejected by most or all justices. In fact, compliance with the majority rule is almost impossible when a later court extracts a hyper-narrow rule from a fragmented decision, since each and every justice would presumably prefer her own broader, more principled alternative. 129 Common law courts avoided these problems by generally withholding precedential force from isolated decisions, 130 as well as decisions without a common rationale.
131 Courts today should likewise view even the results in fragmented decisions as nonbinding. In a fragmented decision featuring a four-justice dissent, for example, the dissenters' rule would have at least as much support as any other justice's rule. Why not treat that kind of ruling as a temporary decision not to fashion precedent, thereby allowing lower courts to test out the dissents' relatively popular position? Doing so would encourage the justices to compromise on a clear rule of decision and facilitate lower court experimentation.
In sum, there is no good reason to postpone the hard work of figuring out what the justices have decided until later litigation, when the justices themselves could more accurately and easily do that work at the time they issue their decision. And eliminating the possibility of seizing the "narrowest grounds" would have the happy effect of encouraging the justices to form majority opinions, creating clear precedent.
B. Versions of Marks
Just what is "that position taken by those members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds"? 132 Marks's defenders have proposed four principal answers, and each suggests a possible way of defending the rule against the previous Section's critique. 129 See text accompanying infra note 156 (exploring situations where half a loaf is worse than a whole). Resultsbased stare decisis can lay claim to the virtue of treating like cases alike; but the legal system frequently allows like cases to be treated differently, such as to foster percolation, when doing so is consistent with precedent. ("Legal principles were considered authoritative not because a particular institution had announced them but because they had received the approval of the community over time, an approval evidenced by repeated adherence to them in individual decisions."); see also DUXBURY, supra note 21, at 17-18 ("By the late eighteenth century, there certainly existed among the English judiciary a practice of following precedents, but the fact that there was as yet no clear and established court hierarchy made it difficult and often impossible to say that one decision was binding on another because of the source from which it emanated."). Perhaps the Constitution modified the common law rule by creating "one supreme Court" in contrast with federal "inferior Courts." U.S. art. III, § 1. But scholars debate whether these terms were originally understood to generate any hierarchical relationship at all, much less whether they required a change in the common law rule of precedent. 
Median Opinion
The median opinion approach is the idea that the binding precedent in a fragmented decision is the concurring opinion that represents the views of the median justice. 133 So if three justices concurring in the judgment vote to invalidate on Condition X and two justices concurring in the judgment vote to invalidate on Condition Y, with the rest dissenting, then Marks directs lower courts to inquire which of the two conditions has wider application. If Condition X is more often satisfied, then courts may conclude that the opinion adopting Condition Y is "narrower" than the other.
Below, Figure 1 illustrates this basic interrelationship. Two rules apply to fact patterns represented by their respective shapes. Rule 1 might be proposed by a four-justice plurality and Rule 2 by a two-justice concurrence in the judgment (with other justices dissenting). The overlapping zone represents fact patterns where the two opinions converge on the result. Because Rule 1 applies in a wider range of cases, most courts would view Rule 2 as the median opinion. The median opinion approach's threshold vulnerability is its reliance on an unspecified conception of precedential narrowness. 134 The need to ascertain narrowness generates epistemic difficulties, as litigants and courts may not know how often competing legal rules will find practical application. And even if the relevant tests' frequency of application were clear, it is unclear whether mere frequency should be the sole measure of a legal rule's breadth, since a rule's practical effects are often multivalent. For example, a plurality's rule might find a rights violation in capital cases, whereas a concurrence in the judgment might find a violation in misdemeanor cases. In that situation, the concurrence in the judgment would find more frequent application, but in lower-stakes cases. Which opinion is "narrower"? The answer to that question seems to rest on an inherently disputable value judgment, rather than a feature inherent in logic or the nature of precedent. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has recently divided as to which opinion is narrowest when a fractured Court finds no constitutional violation and so upholds a law: is the was not necessary to generate a majority on the judgment. That view could be defended on grounds of promoting minimalism, but it plainly contravenes judicial majoritarianism and so lacks defenders. 133 See MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHANGE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 124-41 (2000); Williams, supra note 16, at 813 (calling this the "fifth vote approach"); e.g., Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 581 F.3d 460, 465 (7th Cir. 2009) (Easterbrook, J.) ("Because the other Justices divided 4 to 4, and Justice Kennedy was in the middle, his views establish the holding."). 134 The evident difficulty of finding a principled way to identify the "narrowest" opinion is sometimes taken as support for logical subset approach, discussed below. See Subsection II.B.2 In other words, one opinion might be "narrower" than another at least (and perhaps only) when it would yield a certain result in every situation where the other opinion would as well.
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"narrowest" opinion the one that would find the fewest constitutional violations, or the one that would uphold the fewest laws? 135 More fundamentally, the median opinion approach paradoxically ascribes precedential force to minority opinions that all other justices have declined to join. In fact, the median opinion approach often supports rules that most justices actively oppose. 136 While hardly perfect, the Court represents an expert decision-making unit with access to relatively lavish resources.
137 So when most justices undertake an appropriate deliberative process and then reject a legal rule, there is reason to reject its precedential force. And that is just what happens in most fragmented decisions: the justices' expertise points in multiple contradictory directions, each represented in a different opinion. In principle, assigning precedential force to minority views could promote legal correctness. As we have seen, supporters of trimming could conceivably take such a position. 138 If anything, however, the median opinion approach seems designed to maximize the chances that erroneous legal views become law. Freeman nicely illustrates this problem, as the median opinion approach would give precedential force to Justice Sotomayor's solo concurrence in the judgment, even though all eight other justices wrote or joined opinions rejecting Sotomayor's approach as indefensibly arbitrary.
In addition to supporting precedential rules that are opposed by most justices, the median opinion approach also supports case outcomes that most justices oppose. In general, the median opinion would be outvoted whenever at least five justices in non-median opinions would converge on the same outcome.
139 Take Rapanos v. United States. 140 To simplify, a four-justice plurality adopted a rule of decision that would find federal regulatory jurisdiction in all cases with Conditions A or B; Justice Kennedy's solo concurrence in the judgment would have found jurisdiction in cases involving Conditions B or C; and the four-justice dissent would have found jurisdiction in any case involving Conditions A, B, C, or D. 141 We can schematize Rapanos as an "AB / BC // ABCD" split, where the " / " signifies a division among the concurring justices and a " // " signifies the break between concurring and dissenting justices. If Condition A is more rarely present than Condition C, then the AB opinion might be the narrowest concurring opinion and binding under the median opinion approach. But the AB opinion would still be outvoted in 135 See Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 849 F.3d 266, 280 (6th Cir. 2017) ("Although Justice Thomas's conception of coercion [in Town of Greece] is more restrictive, Justice Kennedy's conception of coercion 'offers the least change to the law.'"), superseded en banc (Sept. 6, 2017) (reserving whether Thomas's or Kennedy's opinions controls under Marks due to intracourt disagreement). One way to view this dispute is to say that judges are unsure whether to assess narrowness with reference to the Court's judgment or with reference to practical consequencesan issue that also arises under the logical subset approach discussed in the next Subsection. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 694 (3d Cir. 1991) (espousing a judgment-relative approach); see also Asher Steinberg, A Sixth Circuit-Themed Primer on the Marks Doctrine, and an Endorsement of a Proposal to Overhaul Marks, NARROWEST GROUNDS BLOG (July 13, 2017) (also espousing a judgment-relative approach). 136 See, e.g., King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc) ("When eight of nine Justices do not subscribe to a given approach to a legal question, it surely cannot be proper to endow that approach with controlling force, no matter how persuasive it may be."); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 64 (1st Cir. 2006) . 137 Caminker, supra note 130, at 845-49 (outlining a proficiency-based view). 138 See text accompanying supra note 100. 139 The median opinion approach thus defies the "prediction model" of precedent, which dictates that lower courts should aim to decide cases in the way that they expect higher courts to rule. See infra note 193. 140 547 U.S. 715 (2006) . 141 See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 739 (plurality opinion); id. at 742; id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); id. at 779-780. The dissent would find jurisdiction when either the plurality or Kennedy would find jurisdiction, as well as in other cases. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
cases with Condition C: assuming no relevant changes in the Court's composition and that all justices vote consistent with their Rapanos opinions, the BC opinion and the ABCD dissenters would create a majority for jurisdiction.
The most sophisticated defender of something like the median opinion approach is Maxwell Stearns. 142 Applying public choice theory, Stearns views fragmented decisions as expressions of multi-tiered voting preferences among the justices and so seeks the opinion that would prevail over all other opinions in a series of pairwise comparisons. When such an opinion exists, it is a "Condorcet winner" and, in Stearns's view, should be precedential under Marks.
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But there are three problems with this approach. First, Stearns infers each justice's preferred ranking of the relevant opinions when those preferences go unstated. That undertaking is worrisomely speculative, as well as inefficient. Because every Court decision involves myriad legal and pragmatic factors, there is no reliable way to infer various justices' unstated preference rankings. 144 And why should later courts have to undertake the daunting exercise of inferring preference rankings, when the justices themselves could more efficiently address the point? Second, Stearns appears to assume that the published opinions are the total number of legal options available to the justices, as though the opinions made up a finite slate of candidates for an office that must be filled. But there could be other relevant options, apart from the ones espoused in published opinions, and they would be left out of the search for a Condorcet winner. Finally, there is no need for every Court decision to generate precedent, so the identification of a Condorcet winner-even if accurate-does not justify treating the winner as precedential. 145 It is entirely possible that all justices would rate the same option "second-best" but nonetheless view that option as legally wrong-and so would object to giving it precedential force. If anything, the fact that the justices would have chosen not to forge a compromise majority suggests reluctance about creating any nationally binding precedent.
In sum, the median opinion approach suffers from several difficulties: it demands a fraught definition of narrowness, it tends to privilege outlier legal views, and it fails to predict the outcomes of future cases at the Court. The other versions of the Marks can be viewed as efforts to avert some or all of these problems.
Logical Subset
The DC Circuit and Ninth Circuit both construe the Marks rule to apply only when one opinion concurring in the judgment necessarily approves all the results reached under another concurrence in the judgment. 146 This version of Marks is often called the "logical subset" 142 See STEARNS, supra note 133; Stearns, supra note 59. 143 See previous note. 144 Stearns uses Marks itself as an example; but to infer "the Court's implicit consensus position," his analysis "assumes" a "unidimensional issue spectrum." STEARNS, supra note 133, at 129-29. Because the argument's assumption is unproven-and likely unprovable-so too is its conclusion. See text accompanying infra note 159 (discussing the difficulties of drawing inferences about various justices' views in Memoirs). 145 147 The use of the word "logical" is not merely rhetorical, for the key claim of the logical subset approach is that, in the absence of express or even conscious agreement on the law-indeed, even in the face of express disagreement-some "implicit consensus" may be logically necessary. 148 Yet proponents of the logic subset approach focus on whether the various opinions yield convergent outcomes, rather than searching for a legal principle that is logically entailed by the opinions of most justices. 149 This focus on convergent outcomes is presumably necessary in order to explain how the Marks rule could find a logical subset in any realistic set of cases, including in Marks itself.
Below, Figure 2 illustrates the logical subset approach. The less widely applicable rule, here Rule 1, exclusively applies in cases where Rule 2 also applies, yielding outcome convergence. Rule 1 would therefore qualify as a logical subset of Rule 2. The logical subset approach is designed to explain the outcome in Marks itself, so let us again consider Memoirs. 150 Focusing on the opinions that concurred in the judgment, 151 the Memoirs justices respectively advanced rules of decision that would invalidate some and all dissenting opinions can contribute to logical subsets. Davis, 825 F.3d at 1025. But see King, 950 F.2d at 783 (denying that dissents can do so); Davis, 825 F.3d at 1028 (Christen, J., concurring) (same).
147 "Marks is workable-one opinion can be meaningfully regarded as 'narrower' than another-only when one opinion is a logical subset of other, broader opinions." King, 950 F.2d at 781; see Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 46 (1993) (discussing cases where "rationales for the majority outcome are nested, fitting within each other like Russian dolls"). 148 In fact, some commentators call this approach the "implicit consensus" version of Marks. See Williams, supra note 16, at 808; Thurmon, supra note 16, at 428. 149 One might imagine altering the logical subset approach so that it yielded a Marks precedent only when a separate opinion advanced propositions that were logically entailed by the propositions in another opinion. For example, if a plurality asserted a proposition and a fifth-vote concurrence in the judgment asserted the proposition's contrapositive, there would indeed be logically entailed agreement. But even that approach would be inefficient, insofar as the relevant interpretive and logical work could be done by the justices themselves.
150 383 U.S. 413 (1966), discussed in text accompanying supra note 26. 151 The leading logical-subset cases look only to concurrences, and my discussion follows that premise, even though it is neither a necessary feature of the view nor essential to my critique. obscenity laws. 152 We can schematize this scenario by describing the plurality as invalidating if Condition A is present (Rule 1) and the concurrence in the judgment as invalidating if Condition A or Condition B is present (Rule 2), yielding an "A/AB" split. Under the logical subset approach, Memoirs yielded a binding holding that would require invalidation whenever Condition A is present. This situation contrasts with cases where the dueling opinions advance tests that only partially overlap with one another. Imagine that the plurality would invalidate if Conditions A or B are present and the concurrence in the judgment would invalidate if Conditions B or C are present, yielding an "AB/BC" split. That lineup would yield no precedent under the logical subset approach: there would be times when the plurality's test would be satisfied and the other opinion's test wouldn't be, and vice versa.
In practical terms, the logical-subset approach purports to sacrifice guidance in favor of confidence. That is, instead of finding Marks holdings in every, or even most, fractured Supreme Court decisions, the logical subset-approach aspires to recognize Marks holdings only when one opinion is logically and therefore inescapably "narrower" than any other. To see the stark limits imposed by the logical subset approach, return to Rapanos. 153 As we have seen, we can simplify and schematize Rapanos as an "AB / BC // ABCD" split. In some cases, only the plurality would find jurisdiction; in other cases, only the concurrence in the judgment would find jurisdiction. 154 Thus, no concurring opinion was the logical subset of another, and the logical subset view would accordingly find no Marks precedent.
Yet endorsement of a "broader" proposition does not necessarily or logically entail an implicit endorsement of any "narrower" proposition. 155 Reasons for breadth do not always tolerate narrowness, and half a loaf could very well be worse than no loaf at all. By neglecting analogous possibilities, proponents of the logical subset approach commit a version of "the fallacy of division," whose better-known sibling is the fallacy of composition. 156 To illustrate how the fallacy of division underlies the logical subset approach, imagine two possible legal rules. Rule 1 maintains that capital punishment is categorically unlawful. Rule 2 maintains that capital punishment is unlawful for Christian defendants. Clearly, support for Rule 1 in no way requires or implies support for treating Rule 2 as precedent, which would represent (or at least allow for) religious discrimination. In fact, many people who support Rule 1 might prefer that Rule 2 be rejected, rather than allow that it be accepted as law. Here and elsewhere, creating a limitation on a rule can be objectionable-and can even be worse than rejecting the rule 152 See Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418 (plurality opinion) (proposing three-part test for regulating obscenity); id. at 421 (Black & Stewart, JJ., concurring in the judgment) (proposing that obscenity prosecutions are contrary to the First Amendment). 153 outright. 157 Justices who endorse broad positions need not endorse, and could oppose, the narrower positions that other justices put forward.
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Or take Marks itself. Let us assume that the relevant Memoirs concurrence in the judgment essentially believed that no material could be obscene (Rule A), whereas the plurality believed that only material "utterly without redeeming social value" was obscene (Rule B).
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Would support for Rule A logically require support for making Rule B a binding precedent, as expositors of the logical subset view maintain? 160 No. It would be perfectly logical for a justice to conclude that judicial application of the "redeeming social value" test was a greater offense to the First Amendment than continued regulation of obscenity. Alternatively, a justice might believe that the "redeeming social value" test would be harmful due to its unworkability, even if it were closer to the correct legal answer than continuation of preexisting obscenity law. A justice might also view the appeal of Rule B in light of what legal rule would govern if there were no Marks holding. Assume that, before Memoirs, precedent recognized Rule C, which leaves "obscene" material constitutionally unprotected. 161 A justice might prefer to keep Rule C as the law because Rule B raises administrability problems. Or a justice might prefer to preserve Rule C in the hope of making the evils of obscenity regulation more visible, thereby increasing the odds that the Court might eventually adopt Rule A.
In sum, it is logically possible-and often likely-that some or all justices concurring in the judgment disapprove of treating a logical-subset decision as precedential. Far from being an irresistible or even attractive compromise, the logical-subset opinion could very well be the least desirable option available. 
Shared Agreement
In an important 2017 article, Professor Ryan Williams criticized the logical subset approach for offering guidance too rarely and proposed a related solution that he calls the "shared agreement" approach. 163 The basic idea is to view a fragmented decision as majority agreement that at least one of the rules that contributed to the judgment is correct. 164 So in a case where a plurality affirms based on Rule 1 and a concurrence in the judgment relies on Rule 2, the shared agreement approach would say that later courts must affirm when both Rule 1 and Rule 2 apply. In effect, the fact that the concurring justices split between Rule 1 and Rule 2 is taken as approval of a new composite Rule 3, advocated by no justice, that applies when both Rule 1 and Rule 2 are satisfied. The shared agreement approach further maintains that where the new Rule 3 does not apply, later courts must choose to adopt either Rule 1 or Rule 2, as opposed to any other rule that could support the Court judgment. 165 Below, Figure 3 illustrates these basic ideas. The situation again resembles Figure 1 , and each of the rules is espoused by a separate opinion concurring in the Court's judgment. Under the shared agreement approach, however, neither rule is necessarily binding. Instead, later courts have the option of choosing between the two rules. This means that later courts must adhere to the outcomes dictated by the zone of overlap, that is, the set of outcomes where both of the two opinions concurring in the judgment would come out the same way. The basic problem with the shared agreement approach is that it generates precedential rules that are unsupported by any actual or necessary "agreement" among the justices. 166 The shared agreement approach thus has the same core defect as the logical subset approach. We can see this by slightly modifying the examples from the previous Section. 167 Imagine that a plurality advocates the legal rule that capital punishment is impermissible for all non-terrorists, whereas a concurrence in the judgment advocates the legal rule that capital punishment is impermissible for all Christians. Neither the plurality nor the concurrence in the judgment is a logical subset of the 163 Williams, supra note 16. Williams does not contend that the shared agreement approach has operated as a recognized precedent default or for that reason allows for the identification of implicit majoritarian decisions. 164 See id. at 836-37 ("[T]he lower court judge must account for the domain of shared agreement on results defined by the respective rationales that were necessary to the precedent case's judgment."); id. at 852 (emphasizing shared agreement's majoritarianism). Williams argues that the shared agreement approach represents a type of "incompletely theorized agreement." Id. (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995)). But there is no reason to infer agreement on any composite rule. 165 See id. at 836-37 166 While primarily arguing that the shared agreement approach "maps directly onto the deciding majority's actual shared agreement regarding why the precedent case's judgment was correct," id. at 852, Williams sometimes hedges by noting that shared agreement exists "at least presumptively," id. at 829. Those hedges appear to concede that shared agreement is not logically necessary but do not explain why the agreement is sufficiently likely to be presumed. Moreover, Williams seeks to rationalize Marks and so does not explain why later courts should have to test that presumption, given the availability of the more efficient majority rule. 167 See text accompanying supra note 156.
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other. Under the shared agreement approach, however, there is a precedent-namely, that capital punishment is impermissible for Christian non-terrorists. But that result is objectionable-and not something that members of the plurality would necessarily endorse. Indeed, the plurality justices might prefer that their own rule be rejected entirely, rather than enshrine a principle of religious discrimination in law. That example is extreme, but it illustrates a widespread problem. Whenever some of the concurring justices view the other's approach as objectionable-hardly an uncommon situation when the Court has failed to generate a majority-the shared agreement approach will turn out to defy the views of most justices. Consider Freeman v. United States, where an issue of statutory interpretation divided the court 4-to-1-to-4. 168 Far from viewing Justice Sotomayor's solo concurrence in the judgment as a modest deviation from the correct view of the law, the plurality opinion argued that Sotomayor's opinion was "erroneous," that its "consequences … would be significant," and that it "would permit the very disparities [among defendants] the [relevant statute] seeks to eliminate." 169 So it is hardly clear that even a single member of the plurality would approve of lower courts' applying Sotomayor's test. Yet that uncertain approval is precisely what the shared agreement approach must assume.
True, the shared agreement approach does not prevent lower courts from adopting the wisest rule adopted by any concurring justice. Again, the shared agreement allows courts to choose among the concurring opinions necessary to yield a majority on the judgment. 170 So, to continue the previous example, a later court would be free to choose between the plurality's rule barring capital punishment for non-terrorists and the concurrence's rule barring capital punishment for Christians. Yet that riposte only mitigates the underlying objection. The shared agreement approach would still create a precedential rule that privileged Christians, giving them a guarantee of protection that other groups would lack. So even if every later court adopted the non-discriminatory rule, objectionable discrimination would still have occurred.
And later courts might not even have a choice in the matter, since preexisting precedent might prevent courts from adopting the broader rules proposed in fractured opinions. Williams's example is the fragmented decision in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 171 which featured a fifth-justice concurrence in the judgment that arguably contradicted earlier precedent. 172 Williams argues that, if the earlier precedent is incompatible with the fifthvote opinion in Shady Grove, then courts must follow the Shady Grove plurality. 173 Thus, the shared agreement approach calls for reconciling fragmented decisions with earlier precedent. That obligation could create an obligation to follow separate opinions that are objectionable but consistent with previous rulings. Imagine that a plurality would bar capital punishment across the board whereas a concurrence in the judgment would bar capital punishment for Christians; and further assume that preexisting precedent had squarely rejected the categorical case against capital punishment. In that situation, preexisting precedent would arguably prevent lower courts from adopting the plurality's categorical prohibition on capital punishment, thereby requiring adherence to a discriminatory rule supported only by a minority of justices.
168 564 U.S. 522, 533 (2011). 169 See id. at 532-33 (plurality opinion); id. at 546-551 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 170 See id. 171 559 U.S. 393 (2010). 172 The earlier precedent is Sibbach v. Wilson & Co, 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 173 Williams, supra note 16, at 859-64.
The shared agreement approach also has a disadvantage that the relatively restrained logical subset approach avoids: under the shared agreement approach, the binding precedent is a hybrid principle that zero justices expressly or necessarily endorsed. As a result, there is no guarantee that any decision-maker at all has considered whether it is sensible for lower courts to apply multiple tests to find cases where the plurality and concurrence in the judgment both reach the same result. In this respect, the shared agreement approach also differs from compromise rulings that establish hybrid principles pursuant to the majority rule. 174 Take Seibert v. Missouri, where the plurality and concurrence in the judgment proposed different tests to determine whether post-confession Miranda warnings adequately secure suspects' rights against self-incrimination. 175 The plurality and concurrence in the judgment were each prepared to allow for the degree of legal indeterminacy created by their respective testsbut would they have approved of the combined indeterminacy of a precedential rule in favor of applying both of their amorphous tests? 176 If not, the shared agreement approach would paradoxically generate a precedent that the justices unanimously opposed.
The shared agreement approach has one more disadvantage that bears mention. As noted, the shared agreement approach maintains that a fragmented decision yields a precedential conclusion that one of the opinions concurring in the judgment must be correct. While this approach fosters lower court consideration of the various views expressed among the justices' concurring opinions, it prevents lower courts from adopting novel legal rules that no justice endorsed. 177 The resulting constraint on ingenuity is problematic because it would obtain precisely where experimentation is most valuable-namely, where the Court has encountered such a challenging legal issue that no majority can coalesce around a single solution. 178 Marks itself illustrates this problem. The fragmented decision in Memoirs featured a variety of proposed rules. But when the Court later resolved the relevant legal issue, it adopted a new test that neither the Memoirs plurality nor the concurrence in the judgment had endorsed.
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The logical subset and shared agreement approach share the same basic problem: both approaches supposedly derive support from implicit "agreement" among the justices. Yet the needed agreement is only possible, not necessary. And, in many situations, the necessary agreement is likely absent. On reflection, this failure is unsurprising. Fragmented decisions are so anomalous and frustrating precisely because they do not disclose any actual agreement on the rule of decision. The whole point of the Marks rule is to solve that problem-and it cannot persuasively do so by denying that the problem exists in the first place.
All Opinions
Finally, some judges and commentators have proposed the all opinions approach, which has been presented either as an interpretation of the Marks rule or a corollary of it. 180 The basic idea is to view all the opinions in a Supreme Court decision, including the dissents, 181 as automatically contributing to the rule of decision for future cases, at least in lower courts. Judges should therefore imagine how the facts before them would be resolved by each of the relevant Court opinions and follow the course of action (if any) that would have been agreed upon by five justices. This approach generates precedent relatively often-namely, whenever at least five justices espouse convergent results on a given set of facts. Figure 4 above illustrates a case where the all opinions approach would apply. Note that, under this approach, no particular opinion's rule is precedential. Rather, precedent exists where there are zones of overlap among opinions collectively joined by a majority. So if Rule 1 were proposed by a three-justice plurality, Rule 2 by a two-justice concurrence in the judgment, and Rule 3 by a four-justice dissent, then every zone of overlap would identify outcomes that bind later courts.
To illustrate this approach, again consider the stylized portrayal of Rapanos. 183 As we have seen, 184 the split among all the opinions can be schematized as: AB/BC//ABCD, meaning that five justices would thus find federal jurisdiction if A (plurality and dissenters), if B (all the justices), and if C (the concurrence in the judgment and the dissenters). The all-opinions approach would accordingly yield a precedent in favor of federal jurisdiction if A, B, or C. Because the all-opinions approach gives equal effect to both concurring and dissenting justices, it dissenting Justices if they, combined with votes from plurality or concurring opinions, establish a majority view on the relevant issue"); United States v. Duvall, 740 F.3d 604, 609-11 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (calling this approach "the necessary logical corollary" of the Marks rule, applicable when there is "no 'narrowest' opinion"); cf. United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 65-66 (1st Cir. 2006) (collecting cases where the Court counted dissents). 181 In an effort to adhere to the language of Marks, some courts and commentators seek majority convergence on results but exclude consideration of dissenting opinions when finding binding holdings. is unsurprisingly popular among dissenters. In Rapanos itself, Justice Stevens's dissent in effect encouraged lower courts to follow the all opinions approach. 185 Some judge and commentators object to versions of the all opinions approach that give binding force to dissents. 186 Because they do not adjudicate rights or establish precedent, dissents tend to be less inhibited than the sober majority opinions that they criticize. Dissenters let off steam, offer visionary meditations, and otherwise act in ways that the dissenters themselves would view as inappropriate in a precedential ruling with the force of law. As Judge Stephen Williams recently put it, a dissenter is a provocative "gadfly" that might inspire but cannot guide.
187 Yet this reasoning presumes its conclusion: dissents are said to be unreliable because they do not generate precedent; but whether dissents do or should generate precedent is the very matter in question. 188 If the all opinions approach were accepted, then the justices would know that their dissents carry significant force in fragmented decisions. And the gravity of that realization would presumably focus the dissenting justices' minds. Tradition-based arguments against counting dissents are likewise vulnerable. Dissents result from judges' actual efforts to resolve a case or controversy and so are not advisory in the manner of, say, the present academic article. And while federal courts are normally thought to generate precedent only when necessary to resolve discrete cases and controversies, 189 the Court sometimes fulfills a declaratory function, 190 such as by establishing a precedent without modifying any judgment.
191
Moreover, the all opinions approach has a natural theoretical home: the prediction model of precedent. 192 Under the prediction model, lower courts should aim to decide cases in the way that they expect higher courts to rule. 193 In some circumstances, a fragmented decision might be persuasive evidence that a certain position would lose out at One First Street. And, in those cases, it might seem odd for a lower court to invite reversal by deviating from the Court's likely result. When lower courts anticipate the Court's position, they avoid the need for costly appeals, foster national uniformity, and free up the justices to spend more time on making correct decisions. Prediction also safeguards the interests of regulated parties who might understandably try to align their behavior with what looks like the winningest position. What's more, the prediction model's focus on vertical stare decisis strongly resonates with the patterns of Marks citations discussed in Part I. As we have seen, the Marks rule has come to play a much more significant role in the lower courts, as compared with the Supreme Court.
One might object that the all-opinions approach is itself contrary to good prediction, for the Court does not reliably apply the Marks rule at all. 194 When Marks'ing fragmented decisions gets tough, the Marks rule tends to get going-to the sidelines, leaving the Court to address the underlying merits. 195 This objection illustrates a circularity problem, in that whether the Court itself adopts the all-opinions approach would influence whether justices adhere to the positions that they or their predecessors had advanced in prior fragmented decisions. Yet the all opinions approach is a plausible mode of prediction when the Court's composition is relevantly unchanged: so long as they remain on the bench, individual justices tend to adhere to their own previously expressed views. Thus, the prediction model may simply call for modifying the all opinions approach to allow consideration of relevant changes in Court's composition. 196 So modified, the all opinions approach would still have a large effect, particularly since lower court precedents applying that approach would create local precedent that could outlast any personnel changes at the Court.
At this point, one plausible response is to reject the all opinions approach precisely because it rests on the prediction model-a controversial approach to precedent that the Court itself rejects. 197 But the all opinions approach is actually an especially objectionable use of the prediction model and so should be rejected even by thinkers who generally endorse it. The paradigmatic case for lower court prediction arises when numerous current justices have written separate opinions asserting that a dated precedent should be reversed. 198 This scenario has a critical feature: the lower court believes that a considered legal view now has, or soon will obtain, the support of most justices. In essence, the prediction model paradigmatically directs lower courts to adhere to the views of Court majorities that have not yet had the chance to express their views in a formal opinion. By contrast, the all opinions approach focuses on convergent results and so makes a difference precisely in those cases where there is no expectation of majority agreement on a rule of law. Under the all opinions approach, the precedential effect of a fractured opinion is the combination of all the rules advocated in various separate opinions. Yet not a single justice would necessarily approve of the resulting combination of rules. 199 And following that approach would yield a pattern of outcomes that is 194 See Thurmon, supra note 16, at 441 (" [T] he Supreme Court's disregard for the Marks 'narrowest grounds' rule undermines its predictive ability"). 195 See, e.g., text accompanying supra note 45 (noting that the Court sometimes sidesteps Marks issues). 196 For reasons of administrability or legitimacy, however, a proponent of the prediction model could plausibly demand that predictions be grounded only in certain forms of evidence, such as published judicial opinions, thereby shrinking the gap between the prediction model and other approaches. See Caminker, supra note 193; see also Duvall, 740 F.3d at 611 & n.1 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (noting the "predictive utility" of the all opinion approach, while opposing consideration of whether the Court's composition has relevantly changed).
Cf. Asher Steinberg, What Justice Powell's Papers on His Opinion in Marks Tell Us About the Marks
Rule, NARROWEST GROUNDS (July 22, 2017) (suggesting that "that Justice Powell was at least inclined to reject predictive, fifth-vote approaches to Marks" partly due to worries about composition changes). 197 See, e.g., People v. Lopez, 55 Cal. 4th 569, 593-94 (2012) (Liu, J., dissenting) (criticizing vote-counting approach to the Marks rule: "[N]ose-counting is a exercise for litigators, not jurists. As a court tasked with applying an evolving line of jurisprudence, our role is not simply to determine what outcome will likely garner five votes on the high court. Our job is to render the best interpretation of the law in light of the legal texts and authorities binding on us. (1943) . 199 Of course, the majority rule would allow the justices to commit to such a combined rule. See text accompanying supra note 35 (discussing explained post-Memoirs summary rulings), and 240 (discussing Gant).
incompatible with the views of all nine justices-increasing the risk of unfairness, incoherence, and harm far beyond paradigmatic cases of prediction.
The all opinions approach also exacerbates a typically overlooked cost to the prediction model. In order for the all opinions approach to apply, most justices would have had to choose not to form a majority opinion under the majority rule. Under those circumstances, it is especially unlikely the justices would want lower courts to engage in prediction. The justices often want the lower courts to do their own level best to solve difficult legal problems directly, rather than first spending time trying to get inside the justices' confused and conflicted minds. 200 By collectively choosing not to form precedent under the majority rule, the justices allow for further percolation and so invite the lower courts to supply helpful illumination. 201 But when the justices need assistance, the all opinions approach stands in the way-and so undermines the accuracy and effectiveness of the Court's own decision-making process.
C. Abandoning from Below
Commentators often assume that because the Marks rule is itself endorsed in a Supreme Court majority opinion, lower courts must follow the rule until the Court itself revisits it-as the Court can and should do in a now-pending case.
202 But while Marks's overruling would require decisive action from the Court itself, a more gradual abandonment can also be implemented first by lower courts. 203 To do so, courts should read the "narrowest" opinion test, well, narrowly. Besides immediately mitigating Marks's costs, narrowing the Marks rule from below gives the Court useful feedback and so facilitates the Court's own eventual decision to announce a new rule. Already, some courts are effecting this transition without losing key guidance or unduly upsetting reliance interests.
Vertical stare decisis is more complicated than simply demanding that lower courts follow instructions from on high. In many instances, courts "narrow from below" by interpreting higher-court precedents not to apply, even where they are best read to apply. 204 These narrow readings of precedent are generally legitimate if they are both reasonable and supported by first principles of law. 205 On reflection, the Marks rule is a suitable object of narrowing from below. As we have seen, there are several plausible ways of interpreting the Marks rule, and each interpretation has a different scope of application. Under the logical-subset approach, for example, fragmented decisions often generate no binding precedent at all. 206 So if a lower court concluded that the Marks rule was wrong as a matter of first principles, then it would be justified in favoring the logical subset approach over other, more widely applicable versions of the rule. In favoring a narrower reading of Marks, the lower court would mitigate the harmful effects of the Court's erroneous decision to adopt the Marks rule.
Several courts have already narrowed Marks from below in just this way. 207 The leading case is still the 1991 en banc DC Circuit ruling in King v. Palmer, which adopted the logical subset approach. 208 That holding had to reckon with the key language of the original Marks decision. As originally stated, the Marks rule calls for treating as precedential the "that position taken by those members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds."
209 Nothing in that statement requires that the concurring justices' "narrowest grounds" had to be a logical subset of the other opinions. So to support its narrower approach to finding the "narrowest grounds," King turned to first principles. According to the en banc DC Circuit, "Marks is workable . . . only when one opinion is a logical subset of other, broader opinions." Based on that appeal to what is "workable," King reasoned about what "the narrowest opinion . . . must embody," rather than what the Court actually intended. 210 For good measure, the court bluntly argued that, if read more broadly, "Marks is problematic." 211 To move closer to abandoning Marks, a more aggressive form of narrowing below would be necessary, based on more recent Court decisions. In Nichols v. United States, the Court confronted a circuit split in which courts had diverged in applying Marks. 212 In an exercise of understatement, the Court noted that the Marks "test is more easily stated than applied." 213 But instead of clarifying the Marks inquiry, the Court simply set it aside. In the Court's view, "it not useful to pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously baffled and divided the lower courts that have considered it." 214 But if it is unproductive for the Court itself to apply Marks in hard cases, why should lower courts do so? That question arose again in 2003 when Grutter v. Bollinger confronted a deep circuit split over how the Marks rule applied to Bakke. 215 Rather than resolving that evident disagreement, Grutter followed Nichols in resolving the underlying merits, without grappling with Marks. 216 In subsequent years, the Court has not found occasion to clarify the Marks rule's proper application. 217 Both Nichols and Grutter strongly suggest that the Marks rule does not bind where its application is unclear or counterintuitive. And Marks itself is reasonably susceptible to being read in just that way. True, Marks is best read as requiring application of its eponymous rule, in one form or another. But the Court's original statement of the Marks rule provides only that the narrowest grounds "may"-not must-"be viewed" as the holding of the Court. 218 Further, reading the "narrowest grounds" test as a sufficient test for precedent would ignore Marks's context, which involved a challenge under both the First Amendment and the Ex Post Facto Clause. 219 Marks also emphasized that lower courts had converged on the same reading of a prior fragmented decision. 220 And Marks noted that the Court had previously clarified the meaning of its fragmented decisions via majoritarian per curiam rulings-which under any standard qualify as precedent. 221 Thus, the Court's precedents can reasonably be read to invite recourse to the Marks rule where it sensibly applies, rather than rigid adherence to it. 222 In other words, Marks might reasonably be viewed as establishing more of a guideline than a rule.
In mitigating the Marks rule's vices, lower courts can also pave the way for its eventual elimination. While the Supreme Court often enforces precedential discipline on lower courts, the reverse can take place as well. By narrowing from below, lower courts encourage the Court not to rely on disfavored rules, including the Marks rule. Narrowing from below can also supply the Court with valuable new information and thereby nudge the justices in new directions. 223 Nichols and Grutter illustrate this dynamic, as the Court cited the lower courts' inability to apply Marks as a reason for the Court to skip past it. 224 Since then, the Court saw fit to neglect the Marks rule-until the Ninth Circuit narrowly read Freeman and adopted the relative narrow logical subset test. 225 Thus, lower courts are already giving the justices insight into the Marks rule's difficulties and nudging the Court to act. In principle, the Court could one day look back on the Marks rule and declare it a mistake that the lower courts had largely corrected.
Lower courts might also worry about the costs of transitioning away from Marks. After all, the Court has arguably acted in reliance on the Marks rule for decades, and some lower courts have likewise applied different versions of Marks in creating precedent. Abandoning Marks would cast doubt on that accumulated case law and preclude future guidance from fragmented decisions. To evaluate those worries, we need a better sense of how precedent would operate in the absence of the Marks rule-which is the topic of the next Part. * * * No approach to the Marks rule finds footing in logic, prudence, or tradition. Historical and pragmatic considerations alike strongly counsel against affording precedential status to fragmented decisions. And Marks theories that purport to find implicit majority agreement among justices are either constructing consensus where none existed or else tacitly relying on speculative judgments about what the justices must have believed. Judges and scholars should no longer rationalize Marks. Instead, they should consider alternatives.
III. After Marks
How might judicial decision-making change if the Marks rule were no more? Without Marks, the justices should continue to consider precedential consequences when casting their votes, as provided by the so-called "Screws rule." Moreover, all courts should continue to recognize both "compromise majorities" and "rule agreement" as precedential. Thus, Marks's elimination would have just one major consequence: lower courts could freely set aside fragmented rulings that exhibit only "result agreement," that is, agreement on the judgment alone. That change would be a net gain for the legal system.
A. The Screws Rule
The law of precedent formation is partly governed by an understudied but influential legal principle that has come to have its own name. Unfortunately, that name is Screws. 226 In Screws v. United States, Justice Wiley B. Rutledge voted against his own preferred legal views in a merits case. 227 Rutledge's goal was to avoid application of the Court's internal rule of procedure providing that, when the justices cannot form a majority on the judgment, no judgment (and therefore no precedent) may issue. 228 It appears that no majority opinion of the Court has ever blessed Rutledge's choice, yet justices have self-consciously followed his example for many decades without arousing discernible opposition. 229 And even more justices have engaged in reasoning tantamount to Rutledge's, without citing Screws. 230 Justices have thus come to view Screws as a non-precedential guide on how to exercise their voting power: given the majority rule, a justice may vote against her own preferred judgment in order to allow the Court to reach a majority disposition. Aptly enough, the "Screws rule" puts the justices to a hard choice: reach majority agreement on the judgment or forego the power to decide the case. And the justices have followed that principle not just when forming majorities on the judgment, as in Screws itself, but also when creating compromise majority opinions. 231 In other words, justices have voted for judgments that they believed were legally incorrect, in order to allow the formation of majority precedents.
One might object that the Screws rule is illegitimate because it authorizes justices to vote for dispositions that they believe are legally incorrect. That practice implicates, and arguably contravenes, the essence of judicial obligation: to decide in accordance with law. 232 But that objection does not grapple with the crisis of legal fidelity that gives rise to the problem that the Screws rule means to solve. The relevant choice is between two plausible but imperfect means of discharging the oath of office: voting in accord with one's views to the detriment of those views' realization, or voting differently from one's views in order to realize those views imperfectly. The Screws rule applies only in those unusual cases when a justice believes that she can more fully or reliably achieve outcomes consistent with her own legal views by voting against those views. And when that belief is present, the party who loses out on the justice's vote might not have any ground to complain. 233 True, the party could object at having been deprived of a supportive (if overridden) vote. But a justice who uses the Screws rule expresses her preferred outcome and so gives the party some public vindication.
Perhaps the party could fairly object to the issuance of a legally wrong judgment or precedent, particularly if the results redound to the party's disadvantage. But even that is unclear. Counterintuitive though it may seem, parties would at least sometimes want to lose supportive votes, if the changed vote would allow for more meaningful relief or, failing that, better case law for themselves sand future litigants. The Screws rule's permissibility may thus depend on whether a justice finds that, given their colleagues' views, she actually helps (or at least don't harm) the party she votes against. The justice may also be bound to foster transparency by candidly announcing her first preference and explaining her ultimate vote.
Screws itself involved a justice's vote to join the judgment of the Court, not the opinion of the Court. In other words, Rutledge created a majority on the judgement but did not join in the majority opinion of the Court and so avoided the creation of precedent under the majority rule.
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Perhaps the Screws rule should be limited to votes on the judgment akin to Rutledge's, and so should not authorize votes in favor of precedential majority opinions where the voting justice disagrees with those opinions. But that extension seems justifiable, for much the same reasons as the core use of the Screws rule. Votes to form compromise majorities can effectuate the justices' actual views of the law, without unfairly harming a party or violating principles of candor. One might object that the need for justices to vote against their legal views is less urgent in the context of precedent formation. The judgment must form in the case at hand or not at all, after all, whereas the Court can usually set a precedent in any other case with appropriate facts. Yet a delay in creating precedent will alter the judgments of discrete cases that become final before the new precedent is established. So if a Screws vote can be justified by the need to improve the judgment in a single case, then it can also be justified by the need to improve judgments in separate cases that would be resolved under precedent.
The Screws rule provides a model for how justices can react to fragmented decisions in the absence of the Marks rule. Rather than forcing later courts to struggle with fragmented decisions, the justices themselves should sort out their differences where appropriate, or else forego the power to create binding precedential rules. The next Section addresses one way that the Screws rule can bear fruit: by fostering compromise majorities.
B. Compromise Majorities
We have seen that eliminating the Marks rule would encourage the formation of majority opinions by eliminating the median justice's incentive to occupy the narrowest ground. 235 But the justices already have reason to form majority opinions. 236 For example, a justice might want to avoid creating difficult Marks questions that could divide lower courts. 237 Or a justices might form a majority opinion to establish a desirable precedent, despite misgivings regarding the rule that she votes to establish. These are cases of "compromise majorities." 238 While many compromise majorities are doubtless forged without leaving any public trace, the justices sometimes go out of their way to reveal that a compromise majority has resulted. These cases illuminate how the Screws rule operates in practice-and can help us glean how the world would look without the Marks rule.
For perhaps the most elaborate compromise majority in recent years, consider Arizona v. Gant, where Justice Scalia supplied the critical fifth vote for the opinion of the Court.
239 Scalia endorsed a test that was fundamentally different from the other majority justices ' . 240 Yet the desire to form a majority was so strong that five justices forged a hybrid rule that no individual justice thought was entirely correct. The majority all but acknowledged that its rule of decision resulted from the need to get Scalia's vote, 241 and Scalia confirmed as much in his concurrence. 242 Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Scalia's concurrence is that it acknowledged not just the need for "certainty" in this field but also the problem of "leaving the current understanding of [precedent] in effect." 243 In other words, a fractured "4-to-1-to-4 opinion" seemed undesirable in part because it would leave open the possibility that past, erroneous rulings would still be followed. 244 Only a new majority opinion, Scalia suggested, would definitively establish a new rule of decision. And so it has: since Gant, there has been no serious question that the majority opinion controls. 245 Or take AT&T v Concepcion, where Justice Scalia wrote a five-justice opinion. 246 In addition to joining the majority, Justice Thomas wrote a concurrence to explain that he disagreed with the very rule of decision he had just signed onto. 247 As Thomas put it:
I think that the Court's test will often lead to the same outcome as my textual interpretation and that, when possible, it is important in interpreting statutes to give lower courts guidance from a majority of the Court. [ ] Therefore, although I adhere to my views . . . I reluctantly join the Court's opinion.
248
Thomas adduced two main reasons for "reluctantly" joining an opinion he disagreed with. First, the Court's opinion would "often lead to the same outcome" as Thomas's preferred test.
249
Second, forming a majority opinion would better "give lower courts guidance." 250 Though Thomas did not cite any authority for that two-prong rationale, other justices have acted similarly-and pointed to one another's decisions as authority. 251 For example, Justice O'Connor set out very similar reasoning in US Airways v. Barnett: "in order that the Court may adopt a rule, and because I believe the Court's rule will often lead to the same outcome as the one I would have adopted, I join the Court's opinion despite my concerns."
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In short, Justices Thomas and O'Connor availed themselves of a broadly construed Screws rule and chose to trade off what they regarded as accuracy in exchange for greater settlement. 253 Thomas's decision to form a compromise majority may have been informed by an unstated assumption about precedent default rules, including the likely operation of the Marks rule. For example, if Thomas had not joined Scalia's opinion, then at least some lower courts would probably have applied the logical subset version of the Marks rule and concluded that Concepcion created no binding precedent at all. Meanwhile, other courts might have opted for the all opinions approach and so found a binding precedent. Thomas's decision averted those outcomes. Both lower courts and the Court itself have treated Concepcion as though it were any other majority opinion-despite the express disagreement among the majority. 254 And that approach is correct. As we have seen, efficiency dictates that express agreement among the justices should control the precedential effect of otherwise legitimate rulings.
Notably, compromise majorities can and often do coexist with partial plurality opinions. In other words, the justices supporting the judgment may form a partial majority opinion that expresses the agreed upon rule, even as they write separately in pluralities and concurrences in the judgment to disagree with one another, either as to the ideal rule or as to the rationale.
McDonald v. City of Chicago provides an example of a compromise partial majority with disagreement on the rationale. 256 The plurality held that the Second Amendment was incorporated against the states as a matter due process, whereas the partial concurrence in the judgment relied on the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 257 But all five of those justices formed a partial majority opinion and agreed that the Second Amendment was incorporated. 258 Thus, McDonald does not require recourse to Marks at all. Lower courts agree: they treat the Court's decision on incorporation as binding, without applying the Marks rule.
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The Court's regular practice of forging compromise majorities is instructive for several reasons. For one thing, this practice shows that it is realistic to expect that, in the absence of the Marks rule, the justices would often form compromise majorities rather than issue fragmented decisions. More than that, these cases show that the justices recognize the need for precedential guidance and respond accordingly, even to the point of changing their votes on the judgment of the Court. So if there is ever an urgent need to generate precedent on a particular issue, the justices can be counted on to reach a compromise, despite their disagreements. Finally, these cases demonstrate that compromise majorities accord with tradition, since most recent justices have explicitly engaged in this practice at one time or another-and no justice seems to have opposed it. Indeed, at least some of the justices have explicitly extended the logic of the Screws rule to precedent formation, thereby developing a nascent, non-precedential jurisprudence of compromise majorities.
C. Rule Agreement
Compromise majorities are an especially straightforward and efficient means of expressing majority agreement among the justices. But what about instances of "rule agreement," where two or more opinions that together express the views of a majority separately endorse a single legal rule? Expressing majority views in this way is somewhat inefficient insofar as it requires interpreters to pore over multiple opinions rather than one. 260 But rule agreement has nonetheless proven workable in many instances, leading virtually all practitioners to converge on how to read certain fragmented decisions. Take United States v. Patane. 261 Though the plurality and concurrence in the judgment advanced different theories, all five of those justices agreed that courts should not suppress physical evidence obtained in violation of Miranda. 262 As a result, Patane has occasioned little Marks attention. 263 In contrast, Seibert-another fractured Miranda 256 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 257 Id. at 748 (plurality); id. at 805 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 258 See previous note. Professor Williams has argued that McDonald affords an opportunity to apply his shared agreement approach to Marks, even though the case featured a partial majority opinion that set a controlling principle of law. Williams, supra note 16, at 831-33. 259 [T] he Patane plurality and concurrence agreed, at least, that Miranda does not require the exclusion of physical evidence that is discovered on the basis of a voluntary, although unwarned, statement. As several of our sister circuits have recognized, this narrow agreement is the holding of Patane." (collecting cases)).
Court's decision-making process by distorting advocates' incentives. Many parties would understandably focus on piecing together a majority on the judgment, rather than raising potentially meritorious arguments that should lead the Court to adopt a single, precedential rule of decision. These difficulties are avoided if the justices create binding rules of decision only when a majority joins in creating the Court's judgment. 274 Without the Marks rule, courts would-and should-continue to treat cases of rule agreement largely the way that they already do. Precedent would still arise from the easy cases, where there is rule agreement among justices who concur in the judgment. And courts would likely continue to view rule agreement that depends on the votes of dissenting justices as informative but not binding.
D. Judgment Agreement
We come at last to the Marks rule's unique contribution to the law: its purported ability to derive precedent from cases of "judgment agreement," that is, cases where the only relevant majority agreement is on the judgment. An important part of that impact is reflected in the frequently Marks'd cases in Tables 2 and 4. 275 While cases featuring partial majorities or rule agreement would still offer at least some precedential guidance after the Marks rule's demise, most fragmented decisions would be ineligible to qualify as precedent.
But does that change yield a net loss, or a gain? On inspection, the Marks rule's actual performance leaves much to be desired. Lower courts often fail to converge on any binding opinion; and even when one opinion does tend to be recognized as precedential under Marks, the result is to reward outlier views that most justices view as arbitrary. So, on balance, the net effect of the Marks rule is undesirable-and abandoning it would be an improvement.
To illustrate as much, consider three frequently Marks'd cases. 276 First, take Williams v. Illinois, 277 which is one of the most often Marks'd cases ever, despite being only about five years old. Despite sharp disagreements among the justices, lower courts have tried to apply the Marks rule. Yet Justice Elena Kagan's dissenting opinion pointed out why any effort to extract precedent from Williams would inevitably prove to be futile. As she put it, "The five Justices who control the outcome of today's case agree on very little," and "no proposed limitation [on the relevant constitutional right] commands the support of a majority." 278 So while she did not under the diversity laws, since concurring justices comprising a majority agreed on that rule. However, the justices' various rationales for that rule did not garner the necessary majority support and so would not be precedential. 274 In NFIB v. Sebelius the majority opinion included a "we hold" statement that seems to assert the existence of rule agreement on the scope of the Commerce Clause-which may have been an effort to overcome the problem of treating dissenting votes as contributing to precedent. See 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2599 (2012). 275 See Tables 2 and 4 in supra Sections I.C and I.D. 276 Examining cases that are frequently Marks'd in the appellate courts makes sense insofar as those rulings represent the Marks rule's clearest effect on the legal system. Still, focusing on those cases might yield an exaggerated view of how difficult it is to apply Marks, insofar as easy Marks applications might be handled without a Marks citation or appeal. But that appropriate point of caution should not be overstated. Courts have reason to cite Marks whenever they confront cases of mere judgment agreement that are potentially outcome-determinative. And federal district court citation patterns resemble circuit court patterns. See supra note 63. At any rate, even ostensibly "easy" Marks applications have a way of becoming anything but: fragmented decisions that initially seem tailor made for easy Marks analysis have ultimately generated disagreement. 280 Far from exhibiting implicit majority agreement on the law, both the plurality and the dissent sharply criticized Justice Sonia Sotomayor's solo concurrence in the judgment. 281 And the justices took no clear position on what, if any, precedent had been created, with the dissent going so far as to pity those "lower courts charged with making sense of [today's decision] going forward." 282 As it happened, most lower courts initially followed Sotomayor's opinion based on the median opinion or all opinions approaches to the Marks rule; but the D.C. Circuit and Ninth Circuit eventually applied the logical subset approach to conclude that only Freeman's result is binding. 283 Those two circuit courts then chose to adopt the plurality's analysis. Without the Marks rule, lower courts would have immediately recognized that Freeman created no precedent, without having to undertake a meticulous analysis of the various opinions and their implications. 284 Third, Missouri v. Seibert illustrates how even relatively convergent applications of the Marks rule are problematic, since they favor idiosyncratic views while undesirably influencing the justices' incentives. 285 Seibert was another 4/1//4 split, with Justice Anthony Kennedy writing the solo concurrence in the judgment. After emphasizing the need for a clear rule, Kennedy concluded that the plurality's "test cuts too broadly and that he "would apply a narrower test." 286 Again, the justices did not cite the Marks rule. However, Kennedy may have been strategically pitching his opinion as the "narrowest ground" under the Marks rule. And dozens-though not all-lower courts have followed Kennedy's lead, with many quoting his opinion's self-description as "narrower" than the plurality. 287 In the absence of the Marks rule, Kennedy might have been prepared to join a compromise majority, thereby providing the legal clarity he desired. And if no majority had formed, lower courts would at least be free to adopt a position that differed from Kennedy's outlier views.
None of this is to deny that abandoning Marks would come at the cost of lost precedent. But the Court could address that worry by abandoning the Marks rule only prospectively. In other words, the Marks rule could operate as a precedent default only when construing previously decided cases that were arguably issued in the shadow of Marks. True, even declaring that Marks should not be used to interpret to later-decided Court decisions would still prevent the formation of new precedent under the Marks rule. But, as we have seen, exclusive use of the majority rule would afford the justices an efficient means of forming precedent when there is majority agreement, and later courts would likewise have an efficient means of recognizing that precedent. 288 Thus, any precedent that might be lost in the future would represent only minority views-and so should not be precedential anyway.
Taking the additional step of abandoning Marks retroactively would incur greater costs. Retroactive abandonment would erase the precedential force of prior fragmented rulings, and any precedents that rested on Marks applications would also be cast into doubt. Moreover, the magnitude of any retroactive precedential loss would exceed the set of decisions that expressly relied on Marks, since there are at least some cases in which judges implicitly applied the Marks rule. 289 Yet that loss of precedent, too, would yield a net gain for the legal system. Where it has been used, Marks has frequently generated confusion. And we have seen that Marks systematically favors outlier views, even when it is applied in a uniform way. Wiping away those old Marks applications would thus create room for renewed thinking-and clearer, more accurate precedent-on the underlying merits issues. * * * The Marks game simply isn't worth the candle-and quitting it would have little net cost. Instead of struggling to derive precedent from disagreement, courts should simply understand from the outset that mere judgment agreement establishes no precedent at all. And because the guidance that Marks has afforded is so ambivalent and dubious, the Court can safely abandon the Marks rule not just prospectively-that is, for newly decided fragmented ruling-but also retroactively, thereby freeing itself and lower courts from the confusing, arbitrary implications of previously fragmented decisions.
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Conclusion
The Marks rule is fast becoming a staple of judicial decision-making in both federal and state court. Yet the rule is ill-advised. Rather than seeking out the "narrowest grounds," however defined, courts should attribute precedential effect to Supreme Court rulings only where a rule of decision discernibly garners majority support. That majority rule for precedent formation would vest the power to make Court precedent with the most efficient precedent creators: the justices themselves at the time of decision. The Court should hold as much in Hughes v. United States.
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But even if the Court leaves the Marks rule intact, the lower courts have an important if counterintuitive role to play: by narrowly construing Marks, lower courts can discipline justices who might otherwise take advantage of the Marks rule, rather than form majority opinions. 292 That basic approach also points the way beyond Marks. It suggests that the results of fragmented and unexplained decisions should be nonbinding. And it supports the justices' exercise of their legitimate if limited power to form compromise majorities. 288 See supra Section II.A (The Majority Rule). 289 See text accompanying supra note 67 (discussing the causes of citations to fragmented decisions that are unaccompanied by citations to Marks). 290 Circuit courts have already shown themselves ready to reconsider Marks applications, at least where doing so is consistent with general principles of stare decisis. E.g., supra note 11. 291 See supra note 14 (noting the cert grant in Hughes). 292 See supra Section II.C.
